If the deal the U.S. has struck with Iran to end hostilities in the Persian Gulf is welcome, it’s far from a victory. Any hopes of achieving more rest on whether the White House is willing to learn from this self-created mess.

According to the text of a memorandum of understanding disclosed to reporters by a senior administration official on Wednesday, the two antagonists have agreed to cease hostilities and lift their mutual blockades of ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Iran will receive waivers to export crude oil and petroleum products and derivatives, as well as access to assets frozen or restricted overseas. Further talks will address the disposal of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile, scope of any future nuclear program, and lifting of U.S. and international sanctions. If a final agreement is reached, Iran would be able to tap an envisioned $300 billion reconstruction fund to be established by the U.S. and its Gulf partners.

U.S. officials ought to be honest with themselves. Israeli and American strikes may have destroyed much of Iran’s conventional air force and navy, degraded its defense-industrial base, and gravely damaged steel plants and other infrastructure. But the country’s drones remain a potent threat, not least to shipping in the Gulf. Its arsenal of ballistic missiles and launchers will be rebuilt. Sanctions relief will help the regime shore up the economy and fund terrorist proxies across the Middle East. It retains roughly 440 kilograms of near-weapons-grade uranium and the knowledge to produce more.

Meanwhile, the U.S. confronts the same dilemmas it did before launching airstrikes on Feb. 28, only now with less leverage. Even a temporary lifting of oil sanctions will put money in the regime’s coffers. Meanwhile, with hard-liners firmly in charge in Tehran and far from isolated in the region, negotiations to limit Iran’s nuclear program aren’t likely to go smoothly. Threats of resuming airstrikes to nudge talks along are barely credible, given the risk of spiking oil prices before the midterms.

At the same time, the alternatives to a deal would’ve been worse. There’s no reason to think a return to fighting would force Iran to capitulate. The world economy desperately needs oil flows to resume. An extended ceasefire and eventual drawdown should allow the U.S. military to regroup, address maintenance backlogs and focus on other key priorities, including replenishing stockpiles of critical munitions. Most important, the agreement puts the task of restraining Iran’s nuclear ambitions back where it belongs — in the hands of diplomats.

The first priority should be to empower them. If talks to reach a long-term agreement are to succeed — whether in 60 days as envisioned or, more likely, longer — they must be driven by technical experts and diplomats with a clear understanding of Iran’s new regime dynamics and strategic logic. The focus should extend beyond the fate of the country’s stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (which must be diluted or, preferably, shipped out of the country entirely) to other elements of its nuclear complex, including advanced centrifuges and research into potential weaponization. Although U.S. negotiators can show flexibility on questions like the length of any moratorium on future enrichment, unfettered access for inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency is vital. Talks would ideally be direct, both for speed and clarity.

The U.S. should also enlist the help of other players, especially Europe and China; Iran has historically responded better to concerted international pressure than to U.S. or Israeli threats. Efforts by countries in the region to reach a modus vivendi with Iran are worth supporting, especially as this deal doesn’t encompass the threats posed by its missiles and regional proxies. No one should be in any doubt about the U.S. commitment to Israel. Nevertheless, the administration should remind its ally that its security would be better served by reconciling with its Arab neighbors, starting with the Palestinians, than by playing spoiler.

Above all, the White House still needs a clearer strategy to support the Iranian people, whose frustrations with their leaders are likely to resurface once the threat of war fades. This misguided conflict has made clear that external pressure isn’t likely to moderate the regime’s behavior. At some point, maybe internal forces can.

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