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Michael Barone

Rethinking the Iraq Critics

Michael Barone
In trying to understand news about the conflicts in Iraq, I work to keep in mind the difference between what we know now about decision making in World War II and what most Americans knew at the time. From the memoirs and documents published after the war, we've learned how leaders made critical judgments. But at the time, even well-informed journalists only could guess at what was going on behind the scenes.

Today we're only beginning to learn about what went on behind the scenes in regard to Iraq. One important new source is the recently published "War and Decision" by Douglas Feith, the No. 3 civilian at the Pentagon from 2001 to 2005. Feith quotes extensively from unpublished documents and contemporary memorandums, just as in the late 1940s Robert Sherwood did in "Roosevelt and Hopkins" and Winston Churchill did in his World War II histories. The picture Feith paints is at considerable variance from the narratives with which we've become familiar.

One such narrative is, "Bush lied; people died." The claim is that "neocons," including Feith, politicized intelligence to show that Saddam Hussein's regime had weapons of mass destruction. Not so, as the Senate Intelligence Committee and the Silberman-Robb Commission have concluded already. Every intelligence agency believed Saddam had weapons of mass destruction, and the post-invasion Duelfer report concluded that he maintained the capability to produce them on short notice. There was abundant evidence of contacts between Saddam's regime and al-Qaida and other terrorist groups. Given Saddam's hostility to the United States and his stonewalling of the United Nations, American leaders had every reason to believe he posed a grave threat. Removing him removed that threat.

Unfortunately -- and here Feith is critical of his ultimate boss, George W. Bush -- the administration allowed its critics to frame the issue around the fact that stockpiles of weapons weren't found. Here we see at work the liberal fallacy, apparent in debates on gun control, that weapons are the problem rather than the people with the capability and will to use them to kill others. The fact that millions of law-abiding Americans have guns is not a problem; the problem is that criminals can get them and have the will to kill others. Similarly, the fact that France has WMDs is not a problem; the fact that Saddam Hussein had the capability to produce WMDs and the will to use them against us was.

Feith identifies as our central mistake the decision not to create an Iraqi Interim Authority to take over some sovereign functions soon after the overthrow of Saddam. Bush ordered the creation of such an authority March 10, 2003. But it was resisted by State Department and CIA leaders, who argued that Iraqis would not trust "externals" -- those in exile -- and who were especially determined to keep the Iraqi National Congress' Ahmed Chalabi from power. As head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Paul Bremer took the State-CIA view and, without much supervision from Washington, decided that the U.S. occupation would continue for as long as two years. Only deft negotiation by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld produced a June 30, 2004, deadline for returning authority to Iraqis. The January 2005 elections placed many of the "externals," including Chalabi, in high office.

Feith admits he made mistakes and misjudgments. He criticizes Bush for not defending the main rationale for invasion -- protecting Americans from a genuine threat -- and instead emphasizing the subsidiary and iffy goal of establishing democracy. He says little about military operations, beyond noting that Bremer and the military leaders had no common approach to combating disorder.

There's still much to be learned about our decisions, good and bad, in Iraq. But Feith's book is a step forward, as were those of Sherwood and Churchill 60 years ago.

========

To read more political analysis by Michael Barone, visit www.usnews.com/baroneblog. To find out more about Michael Barone, and read features by other Creators Syndicate writers and cartoonists, visit the Creators Syndicate Web page at www.creators.com.

Copyright 2008 Creators Syndicate Inc.

This news arrived on: 05/10/2008
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Posted Comments:

05-13-2008 13:43
George Smith wrote:

Iraq

Betty G. is quite right. There was no justification for the Iraq War. There were no wmd's in Iraq, and absolutely no contact between the Iraqui regime and Al Quaida. The reasons given for the invasion were completely unjustified, and history will judge Goerge bush and Tony Blair accordingly. Now why don't we pull out and leave the country to the Iraquis (before any greater MESS is made).
They are mainly a gentle people greatly suffering as a result of this phoney "war" on terror.



05-12-2008 12:24
Betty G wrote:

Rethinking Iraq

When are you folks going to give up on this lost cause? There were not WMD and Saddam had nothing to do with bin Laden. Even your own man, Bush finally admitted this.

Give it a rest and quit trying to compare it to any way with WWII.

This administration blew it big time and you will just have to live with that and all the deaths the rest of your lives.



05-11-2008 13:55
wrote:

WMD's

What you say might be true, but so is North Korea and Iran a major threat. What are we doing to keep them from becoming a nuclear threat? We have used up all of our resources on this useless war.



05-11-2008 05:49
John D. Beach wrote:

Just Cause?

If the decision to invade was based solely on the possession of WMDs and the prior history of their use, there would also have been ample reason to suspect that, if a mad man, under threat of violent removal from office, he most certainly would use them again, especially against an invading force, the American Army. It must have given unit commanders the highest degree of doubt when, upon arriving near Baghdad, no WMDs were used against their troops. Although it was certainly too late to change the course of action predicated on the assumption of WMDs. Evidently they would not be a threat to our well-equipped troops.
Something does not add up and we are just as ignorant as the intelligence community was (is?).




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