He also played a central role in the creation of the BRICS, a loosely defined multilateral bloc consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The bloc has helped reshape the economic and geopolitical balance of the world over the past two decades.

Since returning to power, Lula sought to strengthen the BRICS bank – a funding agency for developmental projects in the Global South that offers a financial alternative to the World Bank. In a show of intent, Lula pushed for the appointment of ex-Brazilian president – and his former chief of staff – Dilma Rousseff to head the agency.

Much as with his domestic agenda of rebuilding social programs, undermined by his predecessor Jair Bolsonaro, in the international arena Lula is looking to restart his project of strengthening Brazil’s ties with a variety of partners. In his first month in office, Lula attended a meeting of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean nations (CELAC) in Argentina, where he outlined a desire to strengthen Brazil’s relations in the region.

Soon after, he visited President Joe Biden in Washington, where both leaders professed their mutual desire to promote democracy and push for a more environmentally sound developmental path, particularly in the Amazon region.

Once that trip was concluded, Lula visited China to deepen trade relations and to try to lead a peace effort for the war in Ukraine. He then went to Europe to meet with traditional allies, like Spain and Portugal.

All things considered, this “many friends” approach isn’t so different from Lula’s experiences of 20 years ago. Then, Brazil was largely welcomed as a rising diplomatic force in the developing world. President Barack Obama, during a 2009 meeting, made special note of Lula’s “forward-looking leadership … throughout Latin America and throughout the world.”

What has changed since are the domestic and global contexts in which Lula now operates. And what was once seen as a progressive pursuit of an autonomous and assertive foreign policy is now being interpreted by many in Brazil and the West as divisive, inappropriate or even a betrayal of Brazil’s traditional alignments.

Such a view, I believe, ignores not only Lula’s earlier international record but also a wider historical perspective. For more than a century, Brazil’s diplomatic efforts have focused on promoting multilateralism and on pushing for the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

And while it drew closer to Western allies during World War II and the Cold War, successive governments in Brazil – be they progressive or conservative, democratic or authoritarian – pursued a policy of self-determination. Shaped by those dynamics, Brazil’s foreign policy has served the country well as an instrument of its own development.

As such, Lula’s overtures to both traditional and new trading partners is not surprising. Nor is his plan to find a solution to the war in Ukraine through the creation of a neutral bloc of mediating countries.

While attending the G7 meeting at Hiroshima, Lula stressed the need for peace talks not only to end the tragedy in itself, but also because it was distracting the global community from focusing on other matters, such as global warming and hunger.

Perhaps some of his statements about the war could have made it clearer that he held Russia primarily responsible for the conflict – something that may have played a role in the falling through of a planned meeting with Ukraine leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the G7. But it should be remembered the contention that countries perceived as neutral, like Brazil, may have a better chance of bringing Russia to the negotiating table is a valid position.

It is unclear at this early stage of his new presidency whether Lula can revive the international balancing act that he pulled off during his first period of governance. The world has changed since then, and economic and geopolitical disputes appear ever more prone to include a military dimension, as the war in Ukraine shows. And although Brazil could indeed play a peacemaking role, neither side in the conflict seems ready to negotiate yet. Similarly, the growing rivalry between the U.S. and China will be difficult to navigate – and given the historic and current economic ties, Brazil cannot afford to pick a side.

In fact, not picking a side could work to Brazil’s advantage. It was only after Lula’s visit to China that the Biden administration announced an increase by tenfold of its contribution to the Amazon Fund. It is clear thus that in an increasingly divided world, Brazil’s nonaligned position could be the best path.

This article is republished from The Conversation, an independent nonprofit news site dedicated to sharing ideas from academic experts. The Conversation has a variety of fascinating free newsletters.

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Rafael R. Ioris does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.