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Selections from the Principles of Philosophy
SELECTIONS FROM THE PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY
OF
RENE DESCARTES (1596-1650)
TRANSLATED BY JOHN VEITCH, LL. D. LATE PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND RHETORIC
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW
From the Publisher's Preface.
The present volume contains a reprint of the preface and the first
part of the Principles of Philosophy, together with selections from
the second, third and fourth parts of that work, corresponding to the
extracts in the French edition of Gamier, are also given, as well as
an appendix containing part of Descartes' reply to the Second
Objections (viz., his formal demonstrations of the existence of
Deity). The translation is based on the original Latin edition of the
Principles, published in 1644.
The work had been translated into French during Descartes' lifetime,
and personally revised and corrected by him, the French text is
evidently deserving of the same consideration as the Latin originals,
and consequently, the additions and variations of the French version
have also been given--the additions being put in square brackets in
the text and the variations in the footnotes.
A copy of the title-page of the original edition, as given in Dr. C.
Guttler's work (Munich: C. H. Beck. 1901), are also reproduced in the
present volume.
SELECTIONS FROM THE PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY
OF DESCARTES
TRANSLATED FROM THE LATIN AND COLLATED WITH THE FRENCH
LETTER OF THE AUTHOR
TO THE FRENCH TRANSLATOR OF THE PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY SERVING FOR A
PREFACE.
Sir,--The version of my principles which you have been at pains to
make, is so elegant and finished as to lead me to expect that the work
will be more generally read in French than in Latin, and better
understood. The only apprehension I entertain is lest the title should
deter some who have not been brought up to letters, or with whom
philosophy is in bad repute, because the kind they were taught has
proved unsatisfactory; and this makes me think that it will be useful
to add a preface to it for the purpose of showing what the MATTER of
the work is, what END I had in view in writing it, and what UTILITY
may be derived from it. But although it might be my part to write a
preface of this nature, seeing I ought to know those particulars
better than any other person, I cannot nevertheless prevail upon
myself to do anything more than merely to give a summary of the chief
points that fall, as I think, to be discussed in it: and I leave it to
your discretion to present to the public such part of them as you
shall judge proper.
I should have desired, in the first place, to explain in it what
philosophy is, by commencing with the most common matters, as, for
example, that the word PHILOSOPHY signifies the study of wisdom, and
that by wisdom is to be understood not merely prudence in the
management of affairs, but a perfect knowledge of all that man can
know, as well for the conduct of his life as for the preservation of
his health and the discovery of all the arts, and that knowledge to
subserve these ends must necessarily be deduced from first causes; so
that in order to study the acquisition of it (which is properly called
philosophizing), we must commence with the investigation of those
first causes which are called PRINCIPLES. Now these principles must
possess TWO CONDITIONS: in the first place, they must be so clear and
evident that the human mind, when it attentively considers them,
cannot doubt of their truth; in the second place, the knowledge of
other things must be so dependent on them as that though the
principles themselves may indeed be known apart from what depends on
them, the latter cannot nevertheless be known apart from the former.
It will accordingly be necessary thereafter to endeavour so to deduce
from those principles the knowledge of the things that depend on them,
as that there may be nothing in the whole series of deductions which
is not perfectly manifest. God is in truth the only being who is
absolutely wise, that is, who possesses a perfect knowledge of all
things; but we may say that men are more or less wise as their
knowledge of the most important truths is greater or less. And I am
confident that there is nothing, in what I have now said, in which all
the learned do not concur.
I should, in the next place, have proposed to consider the utility of
philosophy, and at the same time have shown that, since it embraces
all that the human mind can know, we ought to believe that it is by it
we are distinguished from savages and barbarians, and that the
civilisation and culture of a nation is regulated by the degree in
which true philosophy nourishes in it, and, accordingly, that to
contain true philosophers is the highest privilege a state can enjoy.
Besides this, I should have shown that, as regards individuals, it is
not only useful for each man to have intercourse with those who apply
themselves to this study, but that it is incomparably better he should
himself direct his attention to it; just as it is doubtless to be
preferred that a man should make use of his own eyes to direct his
steps, and enjoy by means of the same the beauties of colour and
light, than that he should blindly follow the guidance of another;
though the latter course is certainly better than to have the eyes
closed with no guide except one's self. But to live without
philosophizing is in truth the same as keeping the eyes closed without
attempting to open them; and the pleasure of seeing all that sight
discloses is not to be compared with the satisfaction afforded by the
discoveries of philosophy. And, finally, this study is more
imperatively requisite for the regulation of our manners, and for
conducting us through life, than is the use of our eyes for directing
our steps. The brutes, which have only their bodies to conserve, are
continually occupied in seeking sources of nourishment; but men, of
whom the chief part is the mind, ought to make the search after wisdom
their principal care, for wisdom is the true nourishment of the mind;
and I feel assured, moreover, that there are very many who would not
fail in the search, if they would but hope for success in it, and knew
the degree of their capabilities for it. There is no mind, how ignoble
soever it be, which remains so firmly bound up in the objects of the
senses, as not sometime or other to turn itself away from them in the
aspiration after some higher good, although not knowing frequently
wherein that good consists. The greatest favourites of fortune--those
who have health, honours, and riches in abundance-- are not more
exempt from aspirations of this nature than others; nay, I am
persuaded that these are the persons who sigh the most deeply after
another good greater and more perfect still than any they already
possess. But the supreme good, considered by natural reason without
the light of faith, is nothing more than the knowledge of truth
through its first causes, in other words, the wisdom of which
philosophy is the study. And, as all these particulars are
indisputably true, all that is required to gain assent to their truth
is that they be well stated.
But as one is restrained from assenting to these doctrines by
experience, which shows that they who make pretensions to philosophy
are often less wise and reasonable than others who never applied
themselves to the study, I should have here shortly explained wherein
consists all the science we now possess, and what are the degrees of
wisdom at which we have arrived. The first degree contains only
notions so clear of themselves that they can be acquired without
meditation; the second comprehends all that the experience of the
senses dictates; the third, that which the conversation of other men
teaches us; to which may be added as the fourth, the reading, not of
all books, but especially of such as have been written by persons
capable of conveying proper instruction, for it is a species of
conversation we hold with their authors. And it seems to me that all
the wisdom we in ordinary possess is acquired only in these four ways;
for I do not class divine revelation among them, because it does not
conduct us by degrees, but elevates us at once to an infallible faith.
There have been, indeed, in all ages great minds who endeavoured to
find a fifth road to wisdom, incomparably more sure and elevated than
the other four. The path they essayed was the search of first causes
and true principles, from which might be deduced the reasons of all
that can be known by man; and it is to them the appellation of
philosophers has been more especially accorded. I am not aware that
there is any one of them up to the present who has succeeded in this
enterprise. The first and chief whose writings we possess are Plato
and Aristotle, between whom there was no difference, except that the
former, following in the footsteps of his master, Socrates,
ingenuously confessed that he had never yet been able to find anything
certain, and that he was contented to write what seemed to him
probable, imagining, for this end, certain principles by which he
endeavoured to account for the other things. Aristotle, on the other
hand, characterised by less candour, although for twenty years the
disciple of Plato, and with no principles beyond those of his master,
completely reversed his mode of putting them, and proposed as true and
certain what it is probable he himself never esteemed as such. But
these two men had acquired much judgment and wisdom by the four
preceding means, qualities which raised their authority very high, so
much so that those who succeeded them were willing rather to acquiesce
in their opinions, than to seek better for themselves. The chief
question among their disciples, however, was as to whether we ought to
doubt of all things or hold some as certain,--a dispute which led them
on both sides into extravagant errors; for a part of those who were
for doubt, extended it even to the actions of life, to the neglect of
the most ordinary rules required for its conduct; those, on the other
hand, who maintained the doctrine of certainty, supposing that it must
depend upon the senses, trusted entirely to them. To such an extent
was this carried by Epicurus, that it is said he ventured to affirm,
contrary to all the reasonings of the astronomers, that the sun is no
larger than it appears.
It is a fault we may remark in most disputes, that, as truth is the
mean between the two opinions that are upheld, each disputant departs
from it in proportion to the degree in which he possesses the spirit
of contradiction. But the error of those who leant too much to the
side of doubt, was not followed for any length of time, and that of
the opposite party has been to some extent corrected by the doctrine
that the senses are deceitful in many instances. Nevertheless, I do
not know that this error was wholly removed by showing that certitude
is not in the senses, but in the understanding alone when it has clear
perceptions; and that while we only possess the knowledge which is
acquired in the first four grades of wisdom, we ought not to doubt of
the things that appear to be true in what regards the conduct of life,
nor esteem them as so certain that we cannot change our opinions
regarding them, even though constrained by the evidence of reason.
From ignorance of this truth, or, if there was any one to whom it was
known, from neglect of it, the majority of those who in these later
ages aspired to be philosophers, blindly followed Aristotle, so that
they frequently corrupted the sense of his writings, and attributed to
him various opinions which he would not recognise as his own were he
now to return to the world; and those who did not follow him, among
whom are to be found many of the greatest minds, did yet not escape
being imbued with his opinions in their youth, as these form the
staple of instruction in the schools; and thus their minds were so
preoccupied that they could not rise to the knowledge of true
principles. And though I hold all the philosophers in esteem, and am
unwilling to incur odium by my censure, I can adduce a proof of my
assertion, which I do not think any of them will gainsay, which is,
that they all laid down as a principle what they did not perfectly
know. For example, I know none of them who did not suppose that there
was gravity in terrestrial bodies; but although experience shows us
very clearly that bodies we call heavy descend towards the center of
the earth, we do not, therefore, know the nature of gravity, that is,
the cause or principle in virtue of which bodies descend, and we must
derive our knowledge of it from some other source. The same may be
said of a vacuum and atoms, of heat and cold, of dryness and humidity,
and of salt, sulphur, and mercury, and the other things of this sort
which some have adopted as their principles. But no conclusion deduced
from a principle which is not clear can be evident, even although the
deduction be formally valid; and hence it follows that no reasonings
based on such principles could lead them to the certain knowledge of
any one thing, nor consequently advance them one step in the search
after wisdom. And if they did discover any truth, this was due to one
or other of the four means above mentioned. Notwithstanding this, I am
in no degree desirous to lessen the honour which each of them can
justly claim; I am only constrained to say, for the consolation of
those who have not given their attention to study, that just as in
travelling, when we turn our back upon the place to which we were
going, we recede the farther from it in proportion as we proceed in
the new direction for a greater length of time and with greater speed,
so that, though we may be afterwards brought back to the right way, we
cannot nevertheless arrive at the destined place as soon as if we had
not moved backwards at all; so in philosophy, when we make use of
false principles, we depart the farther from the knowledge of truth
and wisdom exactly in proportion to the care with which we cultivate
them, and apply ourselves to the deduction of diverse consequences
from them, thinking that we are philosophizing well, while we are only
departing the farther from the truth; from which it must be inferred
that they who have learned the least of all that has been hitherto
distinguished by the name of philosophy are the most fitted for the
apprehension of truth.
After making those matters clear, I should, in the next place, have
desired to set forth the grounds for holding that the true principles
by which we may reach that highest degree of wisdom wherein consists
the sovereign good of human life, are those I have proposed in this
work; and two considerations alone are sufficient to establish
this--the first of which is, that these principles are very clear, and
the second, that we can deduce all other truths from them; for it is
only these two conditions that are required in true principles. But I
easily prove that they are very clear; firstly, by a reference to the
manner in which I found them, namely, by rejecting all propositions
that were in the least doubtful, for it is certain that such as could
not be rejected by this test when they were attentively considered,
are the most evident and clear which the human mind can know. Thus by
considering that he who strives to doubt of all is unable nevertheless
to doubt that he is while he doubts, and that what reasons thus, in
not being able to doubt of itself and doubting nevertheless of
everything else, is not that which we call our body, but what we name
our mind or thought, I have taken the existence of this thought for
the first principle, from which I very clearly deduced the following
truths, namely, that there is a God who is the author of all that is
in the world, and who, being the source of all truth, cannot have
created our understanding of such a nature as to be deceived in the
judgments it forms of the things of which it possesses a very clear
and distinct perception. Those are all the principles of which I avail
myself touching immaterial or metaphysical objects, from which I most
clearly deduce these other principles of physical or corporeal things,
namely, that there are bodies extended in length, breadth, and depth,
which are of diverse figures and are moved in a variety of ways. Such
are in sum the principles from which I deduce all other truths. The
second circumstance that proves the clearness of these principles is,
that they have been known in all ages, and even received as true and
indubitable by all men, with the exception only of the existence of
God, which has been doubted by some, because they attributed too much
to the perceptions of the senses, and God can neither be seen nor
touched.
But, though all the truths which I class among my principles were
known at all times, and by all men, nevertheless, there has been no
one up to the present, who, so far as I know, has adopted them as
principles of philosophy: in other words, as such that we can deduce
from them the knowledge of whatever else is in the world. It
accordingly now remains for me to prove that they are such; and it
appears to me that I cannot better establish this than by the test of
experience: in other words, by inviting readers to peruse the
following work. For, though I have not treated in it of all matters-
-that being impossible--I think I have so explained all of which I had
occasion to treat, that they who read it attentively will have ground
for the persuasion that it is unnecessary to seek for any other
principles than those I have given, in order to arrive at the most
exalted knowledge of which the mind of man is capable; especially if,
after the perusal of my writings, they take the trouble to consider
how many diverse questions are therein discussed and explained, and,
referring to the writings of others, they see how little probability
there is in the reasons that are adduced in explanation of the same
questions by principles different from mine. And that they may the
more easily undertake this, I might have said that those imbued with
my doctrines have much less difficulty in comprehending the writings
of others, and estimating their true value, than those who have not
been so imbued; and this is precisely the opposite of what I before
said of such as commenced with the ancient philosophy, namely, that
the more they have studied it the less fit are they for rightly
apprehending the truth.
I should also have added a word of advice regarding the manner of
reading this work, which is, that I should wish the reader at first to
go over the whole of it, as he would a romance, without greatly
straining his attention, or tarrying at the difficulties he may
perhaps meet with in it, with the view simply of knowing in general
the matters of which I treat; and that afterwards, if they seem to him
to merit a more careful examination, and he feel a desire to know
their causes, he may read it a second time, in order to observe the
connection of my reasonings; but that he must not then give it up in
despair, although he may not everywhere sufficiently discover the
connection of the proof, or understand all the reasonings--it being
only necessary to mark with a pen the places where the difficulties
occur, and continue to read without interruption to the end; then, if
he does not grudge to take up the book a third time, I am confident he
will find in a fresh perusal the solution of most of the difficulties
he will have marked before; and that, if any still remain, their
solution will in the end be found in another reading.
I have observed, on examining the natural constitutions of different
minds, that there are hardly any so dull or slow of understanding as
to be incapable of apprehending good opinions, or even of acquiring
all the highest sciences, if they be but conducted along the right
road. And this can also be proved by reason; for, as the principles
are clear, and as nothing ought to be deduced from them, unless most
manifest inferences, no one is so devoid of intelligence as to be
unable to comprehend the conclusions that flow from them. But, besides
the entanglement of prejudices, from which no one is entirely exempt,
although it is they who have been the most ardent students of the
false sciences that receive the greatest detriment from them, it
happens very generally that people of ordinary capacity neglect to
study from a conviction that they want ability, and that others, who
are more ardent, press on too rapidly: whence it comes to pass that
they frequently admit principles far from evident, and draw doubtful
inferences from them. For this reason, I should wish to assure those
who are too distrustful of their own ability that there is nothing in
my writings which they may not entirely understand, if they only take
the trouble to examine them; and I should wish, at the same time, to
warn those of an opposite tendency that even the most superior minds
will have need of much time and attention to remark all I designed to
embrace therein.
After this, that I might lead men to understand the real design I had
in publishing them, I should have wished here to explain the order
which it seems to me one ought to follow with the view of instructing
himself. In the first place, a man who has merely the vulgar and
imperfect knowledge which can be acquired by the four means above
explained, ought, before all else, to endeavour to form for himself a
code of morals, sufficient to regulate the actions of his life, as
well for the reason that this does not admit of delay as because it
ought to be our first care to live well. In the next place, he ought
to study Logic, not that of the schools, for it is only, properly
speaking, a dialectic which teaches the mode of expounding to others
what we already know, or even of speaking much, without judgment, of
what we do not know, by which means it corrupts rather than increases
good sense--but the logic which teaches the right conduct of the
reason with the view of discovering the truths of which we are
ignorant; and, because it greatly depends on usage, it is desirable he
should exercise himself for a length of time in practising its rules
on easy and simple questions, as those of the mathematics. Then, when
he has acquired some skill in discovering the truth in these
questions, he should commence to apply himself in earnest to true
philosophy, of which the first part is Metaphysics, containing the
principles of knowledge, among which is the explication of the
principal attributes of God, of the immateriality of the soul, and of
all the clear and simple notions that are in us; the second is
Physics, in which, after finding the true principles of material
things, we examine, in general, how the whole universe has been
framed; in the next place, we consider, in particular, the nature of
the earth, and of all the bodies that are most generally found upon
it, as air, water, fire, the loadstone and other minerals. In the next
place it is necessary also to examine singly the nature of plants, of
animals, and above all of man, in order that we may thereafter be able
to discover the other sciences that are useful to us. Thus, all
Philosophy is like a tree, of which Metaphysics is the root, Physics
the trunk, and all the other sciences the branches that grow out of
this trunk, which are reduced to three principal, namely, Medicine,
Mechanics, and Ethics. By the science of Morals, I understand the
highest and most perfect which, presupposing an entire knowledge of
the other sciences, is the last degree of wisdom.
But as it is not from the roots or the trunks of trees that we gather
the fruit, but only from the extremities of their branches, so the
principal utility of philosophy depends on the separate uses of its
parts, which we can only learn last of all. But, though I am ignorant
of almost all these, the zeal I have always felt in endeavouring to be
of service to the public, was the reason why I published, some ten or
twelve years ago, certain Essays on the doctrines I thought I had
acquired. The first part of these Essays was a "Discourse on the
Method of rightly conducting the Reason, and seeking Truth in the
Sciences," in which I gave a summary of the principal rules of logic,
and also of an imperfect ethic, which a person may follow
provisionally so long as he does not know any better. The other parts
were three treatises: the first of Dioptrics, the second of Meteors,
and the third of Geometry. In the Dioptrics, I designed to show that
we might proceed far enough in philosophy as to arrive, by its means,
at the knowledge of the arts that are useful to life, because the
invention of the telescope, of which I there gave an explanation, is
one of the most difficult that has ever been made. In the treatise of
Meteors, I desired to exhibit the difference that subsists between the
philosophy I cultivate and that taught in the schools, in which the
same matters are usually discussed. In fine, in the Geometry, I
professed to demonstrate that I had discovered many things that were
before unknown, and thus afford ground for believing that we may still
discover many others, with the view of thus stimulating all to the
investigation of truth. Since that period, anticipating the difficulty
which many would experience in apprehending the foundations of the
Metaphysics, I endeavoured to explain the chief points of them in a
book of Meditations, which is not in itself large, but the size of
which has been increased, and the matter greatly illustrated, by the
Objections which several very learned persons sent to me on occasion
of it, and by the Replies which I made to them. At length, after it
appeared to me that those preceding treatises had sufficiently
prepared the minds of my readers for the Principles of Philosophy, I
also published it; and I have divided this work into four parts, the
first of which contains the principles of human knowledge, and which
may be called the First Philosophy, or Metaphysics. That this part,
accordingly, may be properly understood, it will be necessary to read
beforehand the book of Meditations I wrote on the same subject. The
other three parts contain all that is most general in Physics, namely,
the explication of the first laws or principles of nature, and the way
in which the heavens, the fixed stars, the planets, comets, and
generally the whole universe, were composed; in the next place, the
explication, in particular, of the nature of this earth, the air,
water, fire, the magnet, which are the bodies we most commonly find
everywhere around it, and of all the qualities we observe in these
bodies, as light, heat, gravity, and the like. In this way, it seems
to me, I have commenced the orderly explanation of the whole of
philosophy, without omitting any of the matters that ought to precede
the last which I discussed. But to bring this undertaking to its
conclusion, I ought hereafter to explain, in the same manner, the
nature of the other more particular bodies that are on the earth,
namely, minerals, plants, animals, and especially man; finally, to
treat thereafter with accuracy of Medicine, Ethics, and Mechanics. I
should require to do this in order to give to the world a complete
body of philosophy; and I do not yet feel myself so old,- -I do not so
much distrust my strength, nor do I find myself so far removed from
the knowledge of what remains, as that I should not dare to undertake
to complete this design, provided I were in a position to make all the
experiments which I should require for the basis and verification of
my reasonings. But seeing that would demand a great expenditure, to
which the resources of a private individual like myself would not be
adequate, unless aided by the public, and as I have no ground to
expect this aid, I believe that I ought for the future to content
myself with studying for my own instruction, and posterity will excuse
me if I fail hereafter to labour for them.