http://www.arcamax.com/nonfiction/b-1054-1
The Federalist Papers
FEDERALIST No. 1
General Introduction For the Independent Journal. Saturday, October
27, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting
federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new
Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its
own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than
the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of
which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most
interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it
seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their
conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether
societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good
government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever
destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and
force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are
arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that
decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act
may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune
of mankind.
This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of
patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good
men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be
directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed
and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But
this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be
expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many
particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not
to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its
merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favorable to the
discovery of truth.
Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution
will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious
interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all
changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and
consequence of the offices they hold under the State establishments;
and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either
hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country, or
will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the
subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than from
its union under one government.
It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this
nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve
indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because
their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or
ambitious views. Candor will oblige us to admit that even such men may
be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much
of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make
its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not
respectable -- the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived
jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the
causes which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon
many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the
right side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This
circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of
moderation to those who are ever so much persuaded of their being in
the right in any controversy. And a further reason for caution, in
this respect, might be drawn from the reflection that we are not
always sure that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer
principles than their antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal
animosity, party opposition, and many other motives not more laudable
than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support as those
who oppose the right side of a question. Were there not even these
inducements to moderation, nothing could be more ill-judged than that
intolerant spirit which has, at all times, characterized political
parties. For in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim
at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely
be cured by persecution.
And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have
already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all
former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and
malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the
opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually
hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to increase the
number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations and the
bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and
efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a
temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of
liberty. An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the
people, which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the
heart, will be represented as mere pretense and artifice, the stale
bait for popularity at the expense of the public good. It will be
forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of
love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected
with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it
will be equally forgotten that the vigor of government is essential to
the security of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and
well-informed judgment, their interest can never be separated; and
that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of
zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidden appearance
of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. History will
teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to
the introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those men
who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number
have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people;
commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.
In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my
fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts,
from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the
utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than those
which may result from the evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at
the same time, have collected from the general scope of them, that
they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution.
Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an
attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest
to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your
liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves which
I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation
when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and
I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded.
The consciousness of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not,
however, multiply professions on this head. My motives must remain in
the depository of my own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and
may be judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit
which will not disgrace the cause of truth.
I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting
particulars:
THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY THE
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION THE
NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE
PROPOSED, TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT THE CONFORMITY OF THE
PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT
ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN STATE CONSTITUTION and lastly, THE ADDITIONAL
SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT
SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY.
In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a
satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their
appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.
It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the
utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts
of the great body of the people in every State, and one, which it may
be imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear
it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new
Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any
general system, and that we must of necessity resort to separate
confederacies of distinct portions of the whole.[1] This doctrine
will, in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has
votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can
be more evident, to those who are able to take an enlarged view of the
subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution
or a dismemberment of the Union. It will therefore be of use to begin
by examining the advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the
probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed from its
dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next
address.
PUBLIUS
1. The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is held
out in several of the late publications against the new Constitution.
____
FEDERALIST No. 2
Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence For the
Independent Journal. Wednesday, October 31, 1787
JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
WHEN the people of America reflect that they are now called upon to
decide a question, which, in its consequences, must prove one of the
most important that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of
their taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view of
it, will be evident.
Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of
government, and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it
is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights
in order to vest it with requisite powers. It is well worthy of
consideration therefore, whether it would conduce more to the interest
of the people of America that they should, to all general purposes, be
one nation, under one federal government, or that they should divide
themselves into separate confederacies, and give to the head of each
the same kind of powers which they are advised to place in one
national government.
It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opinion that
the prosperity of the people of America depended on their continuing
firmly united, and the wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and
wisest citizens have been constantly directed to that object. But
politicians now appear, who insist that this opinion is erroneous, and
that instead of looking for safety and happiness in union, we ought to
seek it in a division of the States into distinct confederacies or
sovereignties. However extraordinary this new doctrine may appear, it
nevertheless has its advocates; and certain characters who were much
opposed to it formerly, are at present of the number. Whatever may be
the arguments or inducements which have wrought this change in the
sentiments and declarations of these gentlemen, it certainly would not
be wise in the people at large to adopt these new political tenets
without being fully convinced that they are founded in truth and sound
policy.
It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent America was
not composed of detached and distant territories, but that one
connected, fertile, widespreading country was the portion of our
western sons of liberty. Providence has in a particular manner blessed
it with a variety of soils and productions, and watered it with
innumerable streams, for the delight and accommodation of its
inhabitants. A succession of navigable waters forms a kind of chain
round its borders, as if to bind it together; while the most noble
rivers in the world, running at convenient distances, present them
with highways for the easy communication of friendly aids, and the
mutual transportation and exchange of their various commodities.
With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence has
been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people
-- a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same
language, professing the same religion, attached to the same
principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs,
and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by
side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established general
liberty and independence.
This country and this people seem to have been made for each other,
and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an
inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to
each other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a number
of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.
Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and
denominations of men among us. To all general purposes we have
uniformly been one people each individual citizen everywhere enjoying
the same national rights, privileges, and protection. As a nation we
have made peace and war; as a nation we have vanquished our common
enemies; as a nation we have formed alliances, and made treaties, and
entered into various compacts and conventions with foreign states.
A strong sense of the value and blessings of union induced the people,
at a very early period, to institute a federal government to preserve
and perpetuate it. They formed it almost as soon as they had a
political existence; nay, at a time when their habitations were in
flames, when many of their citizens were bleeding, and when the
progress of hostility and desolation left little room for those calm
and mature inquiries and reflections which must ever precede the
formation of a wise and wellbalanced government for a free people. It
is not to be wondered at, that a government instituted in times so
inauspicious, should on experiment be found greatly deficient and
inadequate to the purpose it was intended to answer.
This intelligent people perceived and regretted these defects. Still
continuing no less attached to union than enamored of liberty, they
observed the danger which immediately threatened the former and more
remotely the latter; and being pursuaded that ample security for both
could only be found in a national government more wisely framed, they
as with one voice, convened the late convention at Philadelphia, to
take that important subject under consideration.
This convention composed of men who possessed the confidence of the
people, and many of whom had become highly distinguished by their
patriotism, virtue and wisdom, in times which tried the minds and
hearts of men, undertook the arduous task. In the mild season of
peace, with minds unoccupied by other subjects, they passed many
months in cool, uninterrupted, and daily consultation; and finally,
without having been awed by power, or influenced by any passions
except love for their country, they presented and recommended to the
people the plan produced by their joint and very unanimous councils.
Admit, for so is the fact, that this plan is only RECOMMENDED, not
imposed, yet let it be remembered that it is neither recommended to
BLIND approbation, nor to BLIND reprobation; but to that sedate and
candid consideration which the magnitude and importance of the subject
demand, and which it certainly ought to receive. But this (as was
remarked in the foregoing number of this paper) is more to be wished
than expected, that it may be so considered and examined. Experience
on a former occasion teaches us not to be too sanguine in such hopes.
It is not yet forgotten that well-grounded apprehensions of imminent
danger induced the people of America to form the memorable Congress of
1774. That body recommended certain measures to their constituents,
and the event proved their wisdom; yet it is fresh in our memories how
soon the press began to teem with pamphlets and weekly papers against
those very measures. Not only many of the officers of government, who
obeyed the dictates of personal interest, but others, from a mistaken
estimate of consequences, or the undue influence of former
attachments, or whose ambition aimed at objects which did not
correspond with the public good, were indefatigable in their efforts
to pursuade the people to reject the advice of that patriotic
Congress. Many, indeed, were deceived and deluded, but the great
majority of the people reasoned and decided judiciously; and happy
they are in reflecting that they did so.