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Selections from the Principles of Philosophy
XXXIII. That we never err unless when we judge of something which we
do not sufficiently apprehend.
When we apprehend anything we are in no danger of error, if we refrain
from judging of it in any way; and even when we have formed a judgment
regarding it, we would never fall into error, provided we gave our
assent only to what we clearly and distinctly perceived; but the
reason why we are usually deceived, is that we judge without
possessing an exact knowledge of that of which we judge.
XXXIV. That the will as well as the understanding is required for
judging.
I admit that the understanding is necessary for judging, there being
no room to suppose that we can judge of that which we in no way
apprehend; but the will also is required in order to our assenting to
what we have in any degree perceived. It is not necessary, however, at
least to form any judgment whatever, that we have an entire and
perfect apprehension of a thing; for we may assent to many things of
which we have only a very obscure and confused knowledge.
XXXV. That the will is of greater extension than the understanding,
and is thus the source of our errors.
Further, the perception of the intellect extends only to the few
things that are presented to it, and is always very limited: the will,
on the other hand, may, in a certain sense, be said to be infinite,
because we observe nothing that can be the object of the will of any
other, even of the unlimited will of God, to which ours cannot also
extend, so that we easily carry it beyond the objects we clearly
perceive; and when we do this, it is not wonderful that we happen to
be deceived.
XXXVI. That our errors cannot be imputed to God.
But although God has not given us an omniscient understanding, he is
not on this account to be considered in any wise the author of our
errors, for it is of the nature of created intellect to be finite, and
of finite intellect not to embrace all things.
XXXVII. That the chief perfection of man is his being able to act
freely or by will, and that it is this which renders him worthy of
praise or blame.
That the will should be the more extensive is in harmony with its
nature: and it is a high perfection in man to be able to act by means
of it, that is, freely; and thus in a peculiar way to be the master of
his own actions, and merit praise or blame. For self- acting machines
are not commended because they perform with exactness all the
movements for which they were adapted, seeing their motions are
carried on necessarily; but the maker of them is praised on account of
the exactness with which they were framed, because he did not act of
necessity, but freely; and, on the same principle, we must attribute
to ourselves something more on this account, that when we embrace
truth, we do so not of necessity, but freely.
XXXVIII. That error is a defect in our mode of acting, not in our
nature; and that the faults of their subjects may be frequently
attributed to other masters, but never to God.
It is true, that as often as we err, there is some defect in our mode
of action or in the use of our liberty, but not in our nature, because
this is always the same, whether our judgments be true or false. And
although God could have given to us such perspicacity of intellect
that we should never have erred, we have, notwithstanding, no right to
demand this of him; for, although with us he who was able to prevent
evil and did not is held guilty of it, God is not in the same way to
be reckoned responsible for our errors because he had the power to
prevent them, inasmuch as the dominion which some men possess over
others has been instituted for the purpose of enabling them to hinder
those under them from doing evil, whereas the dominion which God
exercises over the universe is perfectly absolute and free. For this
reason we ought to thank him for the goods he has given us, and not
complain that he has not blessed us with all which we know it was in
his power to impart.
XXXIX. That the liberty of our will is self-evident.
Finally, it is so manifest that we possess a free will, capable of
giving or withholding its assent, that this truth must be reckoned
among the first and most common notions which are born with us. This,
indeed, has already very clearly appeared, for when essaying to doubt
of all things, we went so far as to suppose even that he who created
us employed his limitless power in deceiving us in every way, we were
conscious nevertheless of being free to abstain from believing what
was not in every respect certain and undoubted. Bat that of which we
are unable to doubt at such a time is as self- evident and clear as
any thing we can ever know.
XL. That it is likewise certain that God has fore-ordained all things.
But because what we have already discovered of God, gives us the
assurance that his power is so immense that we would sin in thinking
ourselves capable of ever doing anything which he had not ordained
beforehand, we should soon be embarrassed in great difficulties if we
undertook to harmonise the pre-ordination of God with the freedom of
our will, and endeavoured to comprehend both truths at once.
XLI. How the freedom of our will may be reconciled with the Divine
pre-ordination.
But, in place of this, we will be free from these embarrassments if we
recollect that our mind is limited, while the power of God, by which
he not only knew from all eternity what is or can be, but also willed
and pre-ordained it, is infinite. It thus happens that we possess
sufficient intelligence to know clearly and distinctly that this power
is in God, but not enough to comprehend how he leaves the free actions
of men indeterminate} and, on the other hand, we have such
consciousness of the liberty and indifference which exists in
ourselves, that there is nothing we more clearly or perfectly
comprehend: [so that the omnipotence of God ought not to keep us from
believing it]. For it would be absurd to doubt of that of which we are
fully conscious, and which we experience as existing in ourselves,
because we do not comprehend another matter which, from its very
nature, we know to be incomprehensible.
XLII. How, although we never will to err, it is nevertheless by our
will that we do err.
But now since we know that all our errors depend upon our will, and as
no one wishes to deceive himself, it may seem wonderful that there is
any error in our judgments at all. It is necessary to remark, however,
that there is a great difference between willing to be deceived, and
willing to yield assent to opinions in which it happens that error is
found. For though there is no one who expressly wishes to fall into
error, we will yet hardly find any one who is not ready to assent to
things in which, unknown to himself, error lurks; and it even
frequently happens that it is the desire itself of following after
truth that leads those not fully aware of the order in which it ought
to be sought for, to pass judgment on matters of which they have no
adequate knowledge, and thus to fall into error.
XLIII. That we shall never err if we give our assent only to what we
clearly and distinctly perceive.
But it is certain we will never admit falsity for truth, so long as we
judge only of that which we clearly and distinctly perceive; because,
as God is no deceiver, the faculty of knowledge which he has given us
cannot be fallacious, nor, for the same reason, the faculty of will,
when we do not extend it beyond the objects we clearly know. And even
although this truth could not be established by reasoning, the minds
of all have been so impressed by nature as spontaneously to assent to
whatever is clearly perceived, and to experience an impossibility to
doubt of its truth.
XLIV. That we uniformly judge improperly when we assent to what we do
not clearly perceive, although our judgment may chance to be true; and
that it is frequently our memory which deceives us by leading us to
believe that certain things were formerly sufficiently understood by
us.
It is likewise certain that, when we approve of any reason which we do
not apprehend, we are either deceived, or, if we stumble on the truth,
it is only by chance, and thus we can never possess the assurance that
we are not in error. I confess it seldom happens that we judge of a
thing when we have observed we do not apprehend it, because it is a
dictate of the natural light never to judge of what we do not know.
But we most frequently err in this, that we presume upon a past
knowledge of much to which we give our assent, as to something
treasured up in the memory, and perfectly known to us; whereas, in
truth, we have no such knowledge.
XLV. What constitutes clear and distinct perception.
There are indeed a great many persons who, through their whole
lifetime, never perceive anything in a way necessary for judging of it
properly; for the knowledge upon which we can establish a certain and
indubitable judgment must be not only clear, but also, distinct. I
call that clear which is present and manifest to the mind giving
attention to it, just as we are said clearly to see objects when,
being present to the eye looking on, they stimulate it with sufficient
force. and it is disposed to regard them; but the distinct is that
which is so precise and different from all other objects as to
comprehend in itself only what is clear. [Footnote: "what appears
manifestly to him who considers it as he ought."-- FRENCH.]
XLVI. It is shown, from the example of pain, that a perception may be
clear without being distinct, but that it cannot be distinct unless it
is clear.
For example, when any one feels intense pain, the knowledge which he
has of this pain is very clear, but it is not always distinct; for men
usually confound it with the obscure judgment they form regarding its
nature, and think that there is in the suffering part something
similar to the sensation of pain of which they are alone conscious.
And thus perception may be clear without being distinct, but it can
never be distinct without likewise being clear.
XLVII. That, to correct the prejudices of our early years, we must
consider what is clear in each of our simple [Footnote: "first."--
FRENCH.] notions.
And, indeed, in our early years, the mind was so immersed in the body,
that, although it perceived many things with sufficient clearness, it
yet knew nothing distinctly; and since even at that time we exercised
our judgment in many matters, numerous prejudices were thus
contracted, which, by the majority, are never afterwards laid aside.
But that we may now be in a position to get rid of these, I will here
briefly enumerate all the simple notions of which our thoughts are
composed, and distinguish in each what is clear from what is obscure,
or fitted to lead into error.
XLVIII. That all the objects of our knowledge are to be regarded
either (1) as things or the affections of things: or (2) as eternal
truths; with the enumeration of things.
Whatever objects fall under our knowledge we consider either as things
or the affections of things,[Footnote: Things and the affections of
things are (in the French) equivalent to "what has some (i.e., a REAL)
existence," as opposed to the class of "eternal truths," which have
merely an IDEAL existence.] or as eternal truths possessing no
existence beyond our thought. Of the first class the most general are
substance, duration, order, number, and perhaps also some others,
which notions apply to all the kinds of things. I do not, however,
recognise more than two highest kinds (SUMMA GENERA) of things; the
first of intellectual things, or such as have the power of thinking,
including mind or thinking substance and its properties; the second,
of material things, embracing extended substance, or body and its
properties. Perception, volition, and all modes as well of knowing as
of willing, are related to thinking substance; on the other hand, to
extended substance we refer magnitude, or extension in length,
breadth, and depth, figure, motion, situation, divisibility of parts
themselves, and the like. There are, however, besides these, certain
things of which we have an internal experience that ought not to be
referred either to the mind of itself, or to the body alone, but to
the close and intimate union between them, as will hereafter be shown
in its place. Of this class are the appetites of hunger and thirst,
etc., and also the emotions or passions of the mind which are not
exclusively mental affections, as the emotions of anger, joy, sadness,
love, etc.; and, finally, all the sensations, as of pain, titillation,
light and colours, sounds, smells, tastes, heat, hardness, and the
other tactile qualities.
XLIX. That the eternal truths cannot be thus enumerated, but that this
is not necessary.
What I have already enumerated we are to regard as things, or the
qualities or modes of things. We now come to speak of eternal truths.
When we apprehend that it is impossible a thing can arise from
nothing, this proposition, EX NIHILO NIHIL FIT, is not considered as
somewhat existing, or as the mode of a thing, but as an eternal truth
having its seat in our mind, and is called a common notion or axiom.
Of this class are the following:--It is impossible the same thing can
at once be and not be; what is done cannot be undone; he who thinks
must exist while he thinks; and innumerable others, the whole of which
it is indeed difficult to enumerate, but this is not necessary, since,
if blinded by no prejudices, we cannot fail to know them when the
occasion of thinking them occurs.
L. That these truths are clearly perceived, but not equally by all
men, on account of prejudices.
And, indeed, with regard to these common notions, it is not to be
doubted that they can be clearly and distinctly known, for otherwise
they would not merit this appellation: as, in truth, some of them are
not, with respect to all men, equally deserving of the name, because
they are not equally admitted by all: not, however, from this reason,
as I think, that the faculty of knowledge of one man extends farther
than that of another, but rather because these common notions are
opposed to the prejudices of some, who, on this account, are not able
readily to embrace them, even although others, who are free from those
prejudices, apprehend them with the greatest clearness.
LI. What substance is, and that the term is not applicable to God and
the creatures in the same sense.
But with regard to what we consider as things or the modes of things,
it is worth while to examine each of them by itself. By substance we
can conceive nothing else than a thing which exists in such a way as
to stand in need of nothing beyond itself in order to its existence.
And, in truth, there can be conceived but one substance which is
absolutely independent, and that is God. We perceive that all other
things can exist only by help of the concourse of God. And,
accordingly, the term substance does not apply to God and the
creatures UNIVOCALLY, to adopt a term familiar in the schools; that
is, no signification of this word can be distinctly understood which
is common to God and them.
LII. That the term is applicable univocally to the mind and the body,
and how substance itself is known.
Created substances, however, whether corporeal or thinking, may be
conceived under this common concept; for these are things which, in
order to their existence, stand in need of nothing but the concourse
of God. But yet substance cannot be first discovered merely from its
being a thing which exists independently, for existence by itself is
not observed by us. We easily, however, discover substance itself from
any attribute of it, by this common notion, that of nothing there are
no attributes, properties, or qualities: for, from perceiving that
some attribute is present, we infer that some existing thing or
substance to which it may be attributed is also of necessity present.
LIII. That of every substance there is one principal attribute, as
thinking of the mind, extension of the body.
But, although any attribute is sufficient to lead us to the knowledge
of substance, there is, however, one principal property of every
substance, which constitutes its nature or essence, and upon which all
the others depend. Thus, extension in length, breadth, and depth,
constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought the nature
of thinking substance. For every other thing that can be attributed to
body, presupposes extension, and is only some mode of an extended
thing; as all the properties we discover in the mind are only diverse
modes of thinking. Thus, for example, we cannot conceive figure unless
in something extended, nor motion unless in extended space, nor
imagination, sensation, or will, unless in a thinking thing. But, on
the other hand, we can conceive extension without figure or motion,
and thought without imagination or sensation, and so of the others; as
is clear to any one who attends to these matters.
LIV. How we may have clear and distinct notions of the substance which
thinks, of that which is corporeal, and of God.
And thus we may easily have two clear and distinct notions or ideas,
the one of created substance, which thinks, the other of corporeal
substance, provided we carefully distinguish all the attributes of
thought from those of extension. We may also have a clear and distinct
idea of an uncreated and independent thinking substance, that is, of
God, provided we do not suppose that this idea adequately represents
to us all that is in God, and do not mix up with it anything
fictitious, but attend simply to the characters that are comprised in
the notion we have of him, and which we clearly know to belong to the
nature of an absolutely perfect Being. For no one can deny that there
is in us such an idea of God, without groundlessly supposing that
there is no knowledge of God at all in the human mind.
LV. How duration, order, and number may be also distinctly conceived.
We will also have most distinct conceptions of duration, order, and
number, if, in place of mixing up with our notions of them that which
properly belongs to the concept of substance, we merely think that the
duration of a thing is a mode under which we conceive this thing, in
so far as it continues to exist; and, in like manner, that order and
number are not in reality different from things disposed in order and
numbered, but only modes under which we diversely consider these
things.
LVI. What are modes, qualities, attributes.
And, indeed, we here understand by modes the same with what we
elsewhere designate attributes or qualities. But when we consider
substance as affected or varied by them, we use the term modes; when
from this variation it may be denominated of such a kind, we adopt the
term qualities [to designate the different modes which cause it to be
so named]; and, finally, when we simply regard these modes as in the
substance, we call them attributes. Accordingly, since God must be
conceived as superior to change, it is not proper to say that there
are modes or qualities in him, but simply attributes; and even in
created things that which is found in them always in the same mode, as
existence and duration in the thing which exists and endures, ought to
be called attribute and not mode or quality.
LVII. That some attributes exist in the things to which they are
attributed, and others only in our thought; and what duration and time
are.
Of these attributes or modes there are some which exist in the things
themselves, and others that have only an existence in our thought;
thus, for example, time, which we distinguish from duration taken in
its generality, and call the measure of motion, is only a certain mode
under which we think duration itself, for we do not indeed conceive
the duration of things that are moved to be different from the
duration of things that are not moved: as is evident from this, that
if two bodies are in motion for an hour, the one moving quickly and
the other slowly, we do not reckon more time in the one than in the
other, although there may be much more motion in the one of the bodies
than in the other. But that we may comprehend the duration of all
things under a common measure, we compare their duration with that of
the greatest and most regular motions that give rise to years and
days, and which we call time; hence what is so designated is nothing
superadded to duration, taken in its generality, but a mode of
thinking.