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Selections from the Principles of Philosophy
XII. How it happens that every one does not come equally to know this.
Those who have not philosophized in order have had other opinions on
this subject, because they never distinguished with sufficient care
the mind from the body. For, although they had no difficulty in
believing that they themselves existed, and that they had a higher
assurance of this than of any other thing, nevertheless, as they did
not observe that by THEMSELVES, they ought here to understand their
MINDS alone [when the question related to metaphysical certainty]; and
since, on the contrary, they rather meant their bodies which they saw
with their eyes, touched with their hands, and to which they
erroneously attributed the faculty of perception, they were prevented
from distinctly apprehending the nature of the mind.
XIII. In what sense the knowledge of other things depends upon the
knowledge of God.
But when the mind, which thus knows itself but is still in doubt as to
all other things, looks around on all sides, with a view to the
farther extension of its knowledge, it first of all discovers within
itself the ideas of many things; and while it simply contemplates
them, and neither affirms nor denies that there is anything beyond
itself corresponding to them, it is in no danger of erring. The mind
also discovers certain common notions out of which it frames various
demonstrations that carry conviction to such a degree as to render
doubt of their truth impossible, so long as we give attention to them.
For example, the mind has within itself ideas of numbers and figures,
and it has likewise among its common notions the principle THAT IF
EQUALS BE ADDED TO EQUALS THE WHOLES WILL BE EQUAL and the like; from
which it is easy to demonstrate that the three angles of a triangle
are equal to two right angles, etc. Now, so long as we attend to the
premises from which this conclusion and others similar to it were
deduced, we feel assured of their truth; but, as the mind cannot
always think of these with attention, when it has the remembrance of a
conclusion without recollecting the order of its deduction, and is
uncertain whether the author of its being has created it of a nature
that is liable to be deceived, even in what appears most evident, it
perceives that there is just ground to distrust the truth of such
conclusions, and that it cannot possess any certain knowledge until it
has discovered its author.
XIV. That we may validly infer the existence of God from necessary
existence being comprised in the concept we have of him.
When the mind afterwards reviews the different ideas that are in it,
it discovers what is by far the chief among them--that of a Being
omniscient, all-powerful, and absolutely perfect; and it observes that
in this idea there is contained not only possible and contingent
existence, as in the ideas of all other things which it clearly
perceives, but existence absolutely necessary and eternal. And just as
because, for example, the equality of its three angles to two right
angles is necessarily comprised in the idea of a triangle, the mind is
firmly persuaded that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two
right angles; so, from its perceiving necessary and eternal existence
to be comprised in the idea which it has of an all-perfect Being, it
ought manifestly to conclude that this all-perfect Being exists.
XV. That necessary existence is not in the same way comprised in the
notions which we have of other things, but merely contingent
existence.
The mind will be still more certain of the truth of this conclusion,
if it consider that it has no idea of any other thing in which it can
discover that necessary existence is contained; for, from this
circumstance alone, it will discern that the idea of an all-perfect
Being has not been framed by itself, and that it does not represent a
chimera, but a true and immutable nature, which must exist since it
can only be conceived as necessarily existing.
XVI. That prejudices hinder many from clearly knowing the necessity of
the existence of God.
Our mind would have no difficulty in assenting to this truth, if it
were, first of all, wholly free from prejudices; but as we have been
accustomed to distinguish, in all other things, essence from
existence, and to imagine at will many ideas of things which neither
are nor have been, it easily happens, when we do not steadily fix our
thoughts on the contemplation of the all-perfect Being, that a doubt
arises as to whether the idea we have of him is not one of those which
we frame at pleasure, or at least of that class to whose essence
existence does not pertain.
XVII. That the greater objective (representative) perfection there is
in our idea of a thing, the greater also must be the perfection of its
cause.
When we further reflect on the various ideas that are in us, it is
easy to perceive that there is not much difference among them, when we
consider them simply as certain modes of thinking, but that they are
widely different, considered in reference to the objects they
represent; and that their causes must be so much the more perfect
according to the degree of objective perfection contained in them.
[Footnote: "as what they represent of their object has more
perfection."--FRENCH.] For there is no difference between this and the
case of a person who has the idea of a machine, in the construction of
which great skill is displayed, in which circumstances we have a right
to inquire how he came by this idea, whether, for example, he
somewhere saw such a machine constructed by another, or whether he was
so accurately taught the mechanical sciences, or is endowed with such
force of genius, that he was able of himself to invent it, without
having elsewhere seen anything like it; for all the ingenuity which is
contained in the idea objectively only, or as it were in a picture,
must exist at least in its first and chief cause, whatever that may
be, not only objectively or representatively, but in truth formally or
eminently.
XVIII. That the existence of God may be again inferred from the above.
Thus, because we discover in our minds the idea of God, or of an
all-perfect Being, we have a right to inquire into the source whence
we derive it; and we will discover that the perfections it represents
are so immense as to render it quite certain that we could only derive
it from an all-perfect Being; that is, from a God really existing. For
it is not only manifest by the natural light that nothing cannot be
the cause of anything whatever, and that the more perfect cannot arise
from the less perfect, so as to be thereby produced as by its
efficient and total cause, but also that it is impossible we can have
the idea or representation of anything whatever, unless there be
somewhere, either in us or out of us, an original which comprises, in
reality, all the perfections that are thus represented to us; but, as
we do not in any way find in ourselves those absolute perfections of
which we have the idea, we must conclude that they exist in some
nature different from ours, that is, in God, or at least that they
were once in him; and it most manifestly follows [from their infinity]
that they are still there.
XIX. That, although we may not comprehend the nature of God, there is
yet nothing which we know so clearly as his perfections.
This will appear sufficiently certain and manifest to those who have
been accustomed to contemplate the idea of God, and to turn their
thoughts to his infinite perfections; for, although we may not
comprehend them, because it is of the nature of the infinite not to be
comprehended by what is finite, we nevertheless conceive them more
clearly and distinctly than material objects, for this reason, that,
being simple, and unobscured by limits,[Footnote: After LIMITS, "what
of them we do conceive is much less confused. There is, besides, no
speculation more calculated to aid in perfecting our understanding,
and which is more important than this, inasmuch as the consideration
of an object that has no limits to its perfections fills us with
satisfaction and assurance."-FRENCH.] they occupy our mind more fully.
XX. That we are not the cause of ourselves, but that this is God, and
consequently that there is a God.
But, because every one has not observed this, and because, when we
have an idea of any machine in which great skill is displayed, we
usually know with sufficient accuracy the manner in which we obtained
it, and as we cannot even recollect when the idea we have of a God was
communicated to us by him, seeing it was always in our minds, it is
still necessary that we should continue our review, and make inquiry
after our author, possessing, as we do, the idea of the infinite
perfections of a God: for it is in the highest degree evident by the
natural light, that that which knows something more perfect than
itself, is not the source of its own being, since it would thus have
given to itself all the perfections which it knows; and that,
consequently, it could draw its origin from no other being than from
him who possesses in himself all those perfections, that is, from God.
XXI. That the duration alone of our life is sufficient to demonstrate
the existence of God.
The truth of this demonstration will clearly appear, provided we
consider the nature of time, or the duration of things; for this is of
such a kind that its parts are not mutually dependent, and never
co-existent; and, accordingly, from the fact that we now are, it does
not necessarily follow that we shall be a moment afterwards, unless
some cause, viz., that which first produced us, shall, as it were,
continually reproduce us, that is, conserve us. For we easily
understand that there is no power in us by which we can conserve
ourselves, and that the being who has so much power as to conserve us
out of himself, must also by so much the greater reason conserve
himself, or rather stand in need of being conserved by no one
whatever, and, in fine, be God.
XXII. That in knowing the existence of God, in the manner here
explained, we likewise know all his attributes, as far as they can be
known by the natural light alone.
There is the great advantage in proving the existence of God in this
way, viz., by his idea, that we at the same time know what he is, as
far as the weakness of our nature allows; for, reflecting on the idea
we have of him which is born with us, we perceive that he is eternal,
omniscient, omnipotent, the source of all goodness and truth, creator
of all things, and that, in fine, he has in himself all that in which
we can clearly discover any infinite perfection or good that is not
limited by any imperfection.
XXIII. That God is not corporeal, and does not perceive by means of
senses as we do, or will the evil of sin.
For there are indeed many things in the world that are to a certain
extent imperfect or limited, though possessing also some perfection;
and it is accordingly impossible that any such can be in God. Thus,
looking to corporeal nature,[Footnote: In the French, "since extension
constitutes the nature of body."] since divisibility is included in
local extension, and this indicates imperfection, it is certain that
God is not body. And although in men it is to some degree a perfection
to be capable of perceiving by means of the senses, nevertheless since
in every sense there is passivity [Footnote: In the French, "because
our perceptions arise from impressions made upon us from another
source," i.e., than ourselves.] which indicates dependency, we must
conclude that God is in no manner possessed of senses, and that he
only understands and wills, not, however, like us, by acts in any way
distinct, but always by an act that is one, identical, and the
simplest possible, understands, wills, and operates all, that is, all
things that in reality exist; for he does not will the evil of sin,
seeing this is but the negation of being.
XXIV. That in passing from the knowledge of God to the knowledge of
the creatures, it is necessary to remember that our understanding is
finite, and the power of God infinite.
But as we know that God alone is the true cause of all that is or can
be, we will doubtless follow the best way of philosophizing, if, from
the knowledge we have of God himself, we pass to the explication of
the things which he has created, and essay to deduce it from the
notions that are naturally in our minds, for we will thus obtain the
most perfect science, that is, the knowledge of effects through their
causes. But that we may be able to make this attempt with sufficient
security from error, we must use the precaution to bear in mind as
much as possible that God, who is the author of things, is infinite,
while we are wholly finite.
XXV. That we must believe all that God has revealed, although it may
surpass the reach of our faculties.
Thus, if perhaps God reveal to us or others, matters concerning
himself which surpass the natural powers of our mind, such as the
mysteries of the incarnation and of the trinity, we will not refuse to
believe them, although we may not clearly understand them; nor will we
be in any way surprised to find in the immensity of his nature, or
even in what he has created, many things that exceed our
comprehension.
XXVI. That it is not needful to enter into disputes [Footnote: "to
essay to comprehend the infinite."--FRENCH.] regarding the infinite,
but merely to hold all that in which we can find no limits as
indefinite, such as the extension of the world, the divisibility of
the parts of matter, the number of the stars, etc.
We will thus never embarrass ourselves by disputes about the infinite,
seeing it would be absurd for us who are finite to undertake to
determine anything regarding it, and thus as it were to limit it by
endeavouring to comprehend it. We will accordingly give ourselves no
concern to reply to those who demand whether the half of an infinite
line is also infinite, and whether an infinite number is even or odd,
and the like, because it is only such as imagine their minds to be
infinite who seem bound to entertain questions of this sort. And, for
our part, looking to all those things in which in certain senses, we
discover no limits, we will not, therefore, affirm that they are
infinite, but will regard them simply as indefinite. Thus, because we
cannot imagine extension so great that we cannot still conceive
greater, we will say that the magnitude of possible things is
indefinite, and because a body cannot be divided into parts so small
that each of these may not be conceived as again divided into others
still smaller, let us regard quantity as divisible into parts whose
number is indefinite; and as we cannot imagine so many stars that it
would seem impossible for God to create more, let us suppose that
their number is indefinite, and so in other instances.
XXVII. What difference there is between the indefinite and the
infinite.
And we will call those things indefinite rather than infinite, with
the view of reserving to God alone the appellation of infinite; in the
first place, because not only do we discover in him alone no limits on
any side, but also because we positively conceive that he admits of
none; and in the second place, because we do not in the same way
positively conceive that other things are in every part unlimited, but
merely negatively admit that their limits, if they have any, cannot be
discovered by us.
XXVIII. That we must examine, not the final, but the efficient, causes
of created things.
Likewise, finally, we will not seek reasons of natural things from the
end which God or nature proposed to himself in their creation (i. e.,
final causes), [Footnote: "We will not stop to consider the ends which
God proposed to himself in the creation of the world, and we will
entirely reject from our philosophy the search of final
causes!"--French.] for we ought not to presume so far as to think that
we are sharers in the counsels of Deity, but, considering him as the
efficient cause of all things, let us endeavour to discover by the
natural light [Footnote: "Faculty of reasoning."--FRENCH.] which he
has planted in us, applied to those of his attributes of which he has
been willing we should have some knowledge, what must be concluded
regarding those effects we perceive by our senses; bearing in mind,
however, what has been already said, that we must only confide in this
natural light so long as nothing contrary to its dictates is revealed
by God himself. [Footnote: The last clause, beginning "bearing in
mind." is omitted in the French.]
XXIX. That God is not the cause of our errors.
The first attribute of God which here falls to be considered, is that
he is absolutely veracious and the source of all light, so that it is
plainly repugnant for him to deceive us, or to be properly and
positively the cause of the errors to which we are consciously
subject; for although the address to deceive seems to be some mark of
subtlety of mind among men, yet without doubt the will to deceive only
proceeds from malice or from fear and weakness, and consequently
cannot be attributed to God.
XXX. That consequently all which we clearly perceive is true, and that
we are thus delivered from the doubts above proposed.
Whence it follows, that the light of nature, or faculty of knowledge
given us by God, can never compass any object which is not true, in as
far as it attains to a knowledge of it, that is, in as far as the
object is clearly and distinctly apprehended. For God would have
merited the appellation of a deceiver if he had given us this faculty
perverted, and such as might lead us to take falsity for truth [when
we used it aright]. Thus the highest doubt is removed, which arose
from our ignorance on the point as to whether perhaps our nature was
such that we might be deceived even in those things that appear to us
the most evident. The same principle ought also to be of avail against
all the other grounds of doubting that have been already enumerated.
For mathematical truths ought now to be above suspicion, since these
are of the clearest. And if we perceive anything by our senses,
whether while awake or asleep, we will easily discover the truth
provided we separate what there is of clear and distinct in the
knowledge from what is obscure and confused. There is no need that I
should here say more on this subject, since it has already received
ample treatment in the metaphysical Meditations; and what follows will
serve to explain it still more accurately.
XXXI. That our errors are, in respect of God, merely negations, but,
in respect of ourselves, privations.
But as it happens that we frequently fall into error, although God is
no deceiver, if we desire to inquire into the origin and cause of our
errors, with a view to guard against them, it is necessary to observe
that they depend less on our understanding than on our will, and that
they have no need of the actual concourse of God, in order to their
production; so that, when considered in reference to God, they are
merely negations, but in reference to ourselves, privations.
XXXII. That there are only two modes of thinking in us, viz., the
perception of the understanding and the action of the will.
For all the modes of thinking of which we are conscious may be
referred to two general classes, the one of which is the perception or
operation of the understanding, and the other the volition or
operation of the will. Thus, to perceive by the senses (SENTIRE), to
imagine, and to conceive things purely intelligible, are only
different modes of perceiving (PERCIP IENDI); but to desire, to be
averse from, to affirm, to deny, to doubt, are different modes of
willing.