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War and Peace
CHAPTER XXVIII
Many historians say that the French did not win the battle of Borodino
because Napoleon had a cold, and that if he had not had a cold the
orders he gave before and during the battle would have been still more
full of genius and Russia would have been lost and the face of the
world have been changed. To historians who believe that Russia was
shaped by the will of one man--Peter the Great--and that France from a
republic became an empire and French armies went to Russia at the will
of one man--Napoleon--to say that Russia remained a power because
Napoleon had a bad cold on the twenty-fourth of August may seem
logical and convincing.
If it had depended on Napoleon's will to fight or not to fight the
battle of Borodino, and if this or that other arrangement depended on
his will, then evidently a cold affecting the manifestation of his
will might have saved Russia, and consequently the valet who omitted
to bring Napoleon his waterproof boots on the twenty-fourth would have
been the savior of Russia. Along that line of thought such a deduction
is indubitable, as indubitable as the deduction Voltaire made in jest
(without knowing what he was jesting at) when he saw that the Massacre
of St. Bartholomew was due to Charles IX's stomach being deranged. But
to men who do not admit that Russia was formed by the will of one man,
Peter I, or that the French Empire was formed and the war with Russia
begun by the will of one man, Napoleon, that argument seems not merely
untrue and irrational, but contrary to all human reality. To the
question of what causes historic events another answer presents
itself, namely, that the course of human events is predetermined from
on high--depends on the coincidence of the wills of all who take part
in the events, and that a Napoleon's influence on the course of these
events is purely external and fictitious.
Strange as at first glance it may seem to suppose that the Massacre of
St. Bartholomew was not due to Charles IX's will, though he gave the
order for it and thought it was done as a result of that order; and
strange as it may seem to suppose that the slaughter of eighty
thousand men at Borodino was not due to Napoleon's will, though he
ordered the commencement and conduct of the battle and thought it was
done because he ordered it; strange as these suppositions appear, yet
human dignity--which tells me that each of us is, if not more at least
not less a man than the great Napoleon--demands the acceptance of that
solution of the question, and historic investigation abundantly
confirms it.
At the battle of Borodino Napoleon shot at no one and killed no one.
That was all done by the soldiers. Therefore it was not he who killed
people.
The French soldiers went to kill and be killed at the battle of
Borodino not because of Napoleon's orders but by their own volition.
The whole army--French, Italian, German, Polish, and Dutch--hungry,
ragged, and weary of the campaign, felt at the sight of an army
blocking their road to Moscow that the wine was drawn and must be
drunk. Had Napoleon then forbidden them to fight the Russians, they
would have killed him and have proceeded to fight the Russians because
it was inevitable.
When they heard Napoleon's proclamation offering them, as compensation
for mutilation and death, the words of posterity about their having
been in the battle before Moscow, they cried "Vive l'Empereur!" just
as they had cried "Vive l'Empereur!" at the sight of the portrait of
the boy piercing the terrestrial globe with a toy stick, and just as
they would have cried "Vive l'Empereur!" at any nonsense that might be
told them. There was nothing left for them to do but cry "Vive
l'Empereur!" and go to fight, in order to get food and rest as
conquerors in Moscow. So it was not because of Napoleon's commands
that they killed their fellow men.
And it was not Napoleon who directed the course of the battle, for
none of his orders were executed and during the battle he did not know
what was going on before him. So the way in which these people killed
one another was not decided by Napoleon's will but occurred
independently of him, in accord with the will of hundreds of thousands
of people who took part in the common action. It only seemed to
Napoleon that it all took place by his will. And so the question
whether he had or had not a cold has no more historic interest than
the cold of the least of the transport soldiers.
Moreover, the assertion made by various writers that his cold was the
cause of his dispositions not being as well planned as on former
occasions, and of his orders during the battle not being as good as
previously, is quite baseless, which again shows that Napoleon's cold
on the twenty-sixth of August was unimportant.
The dispositions cited above are not at all worse, but are even
better, than previous dispositions by which he had won victories. His
pseudo-orders during the battle were also no worse than formerly, but
much the same as usual. These dispositions and orders only seem worse
than previous ones because the battle of Borodino was the first
Napoleon did not win. The profoundest and most excellent dispositions
and orders seem very bad, and every learned militarist criticizes them
with looks of importance, when they relate to a battle that has been
lost, and the very worst dispositions and orders seem very good, and
serious people fill whole volumes to demonstrate their merits, when
they relate to a battle that has been won.
The dispositions drawn up by Weyrother for the battle of Austerlitz
were a model of perfection for that kind of composition, but still
they were criticized--criticized for their very perfection, for their
excessive minuteness.
Napoleon at the battle of Borodino fulfilled his office as
representative of authority as well as, and even better than, at other
battles. He did nothing harmful to the progress of the battle; he
inclined to the most reasonable opinions, he made no confusion, did
not contradict himself, did not get frightened or run away from the
field of battle, but with his great tact and military experience
carried out his role of appearing to command, calmly and with dignity.